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Abstract—Residue Number Systems (RNS) are naturally considered as an interesting candidate to provide efficient arithmetic
for implementations of cryptosystems such as RSA, ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography), pairings, etc. More recently, RNS
have been used to accelerate fully homomorphic encryption as
lattice-based cryptogaphy. In this paper, we present an RNS
algorithm resolving the Closest Vector Problem (CVP). This
algorithm is particularly efficient for a certain class of lattice
basis. It provides a full RNS Babai round-off procedure without
any costly conversion into alternative positional number system
such as Mixed Radix System (MRS). An optimized Cox-Rower
architecture adapted to the proposed algorithm is also presented.
The main modifications reside in the Rower unit whose feature
is to use only one multiplier. This allows to free two out of three
multipliers from the Rower unit by reusing the same one with
an overhead of 3 more cycles per inner reduction. An analysis
of feasibility of implementation within FPGA is also given.
Index Terms—Residue Number System, Lattices, CVP, Roundoff, Hardware Implementation, FPGA

I NTRODUCTION
On the one hand, Residue Number Systems (RNS) are supplied with efficient arithmetic. Computations over big data are
distributed across small units concurrently and independantly.
On the other hand, cryptography area deals with lots of computations over huge numbers. Thus, RNS is naturally interesting
to provide efficient implementations of some cryptosystems.
There have already been conducted works about acceleration
of RSA [1], ECC [2], and pairings [3], [4]. Advantages of
RNS were exploited so as to optimize modular multiplication,
which is a core operation in such cryptographic functions.
Besides these considerations, modern cryptography makes
more and more room for lattice-based cryptography which
appears to remain secure in a post-quantum paradigm. In
this area, protocols are based on some problems related to
Euclidean lattices, such as the Closest Vector Problem (CVP)
[5]. For instance, this has been used to create GGH [6]
and NTRU [7] cryptosystems. Moreover, interest of latticebased cryptography has significantly increased since discovery
of fully homomorphic encryption scheme by Gentry [8].
This work has been supported in part by the European Unions H2020
Programme under grant agreement number ICT-644209.
Author granted by Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA).



Expected for more than 30 years, this scheme is based on
ideal lattices used within GGH-like cryptosystems. Despite all
those powerful results, huge computational cost of underlying
operations over high dimensional lattices limits feasibility of
practical implementations. A recent result [9] dealing with this
drawback contributes to arithmetical enhancement of latticebased cryptography by suggesting a specific RNS-MRS algorithm which computes Babai’s round-off procedure. However,
this approach has the inconvenience to require a conversion
into a positional system, like MRS [10], in order to obtain an
exact RNS modular reduction.
The present work aims at constructing a full RNS round-off
procedure, which will avoid an inconvenient conversion into
MRS. In particular, the problem of possible inacurracy of RNS
modular reduction operation is addressed by using some of
geometrical properties of the involved lattice basis. Finally, a
full RNS CVP algorithm is analysed and some considerations
about hardware implementation are discussed.
Preliminary definitions on RNS and lattice-based cryptography are given in Section I, along with RNS modular
reduction inaccuracy problem. Section II presents a solution
to this problem along with an optimised algorithm solving the
CVP. Section III details a dedicated architecture, and practical
considerations are provided in section V before conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW
In further discussions, matrices (resp. vectors) will be denoted by uppercase (resp. lowercase) boldfaced letters.
A. RNS and modular reduction
1) Recalls and notations: RNS are based on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) [10]. This theorem states that
given an RNS base B  tm1 , . . . , mn u (i.e. a set of n
pairwise coprime numbers called moduli) there exists a ring

isomorphism
Z{M Z Ñ Z{m1 Z  . . .  Z{mn Z, where
±n
M 
i1 mi . Each integer x belonging to the so-called
dynamic range v0, M v of B is bijectively associated to a tuple
of residues p|x|mi  x mod mi q1¤i¤n . Moreover, additions,
subtractions and multiplications can be performed concurrently and independantly on the residues. Exact divisions by

an integer z are also possible as long as gcdpz, M q   1. In
this case, it boils down to the multiplication by z 1 M .
The main drawback of RNS is that they are non positional
numeral systems. Thus, comparisons require conversion within
a positional system, such as Mixed Radix System (MRS) [10].
The modular reduction is also quite a difficult task. State of the
art algorithms [11], [12] are based on an adaptation of classical
Montgomery’s modular reduction [13]. Such techniques use
some conversion operations between two RNS bases.
2) Base conversions: A base conversion procedure, denoted
Bex pB, B 1 , xq, aims at computing the residues in a base B 1 of
an integer x P v0, M v given in a base B  tm1 , . . . , mn u. To
achieve it, the constructive proof of CRT leads to:
x



n
¸


xi M 1 



i

mi

Mi

mod M.

(1)

i 1

The efficiency of a conversion based on (1) depends on how
reduction modulo M

 or in other words how the
°nis performed,
1
xi M 1  Mi u is computed. It can
integer αx  t M
i
i1
mi
be done by adding a redundant modulus to B [14], or by
computing an approximation [15]. A particularly efficient but
not accurate conversion consists in not computing αx at all
[12]. That way, a conversion is a single

°n matrix multiplication.
But one only obtains residues of i1 xi Mi1 m Mi in B 1 .
i
Another approach is to reconstruct x into a positional mixed
radix system [10] and to reduce it into B 1 . The problem is that
computation of MRS coefficients is not absolutely parallel.
Therefore, it breaks the efficiency brought by RNS.
3) RNS modular reduction: Implementation of efficient
RNS modular reduction is a critical question because of non
positional character of RNS. Optimized algorithms are adapted
from Montgomery’s reduction [13] and use base conversions.
The principle is the following. Let B and B 1 be two coprime
RNS bases and x be an integer expressed in those two bases
and which has to be reduced modulo p. Then by denoting
q  |x{p|M we compute s  x Mpq . By construction,
s  xM 1 mod p. q is easily computed from residues of
x and |1{p|M directly into B. However, the division by M
cannot be performed in B as is. Hence, q is converted into an
auxiliary base B 1 by using a base conversion procedure. Thus,
the exact division by M is performed in B 1 . However, an issue
emphasized by Remark 1.1 rises.
Remark 1.1: As for binary
Montgomery
reduction, RNS


modular reduction gives xM 1 p e  p where e is integer.
The value of e can depend on the sign of x and on the chosen
base conversion technique used to convert q P v0, M v. If |x|
M p and if Bex pB, B 1 , q q gives residues of q δM with δ ¥ 0,
x pq δM p
then the result satisfies p
pδ 2q p. Thus,
M
e P v1, δ 1w. Even if δ  0, e may still be equal to 1. This
error can be detected by comparing the result to p and 0. But
such a comparison requires a costly RNS-to-MRS conversion.
The computational cost of RNS modular reduction mainly
depends on chosen base conversion technique. Because reduction can be inaccurate whatever base conversion is (cf. Rem.
1.1), a new approach is proposed in [12] to accelerate the

reduction by not computing reduction modulo M in (1) at all.
In this case, the final result belongs to w  p, pn 1qpv. It can
be sufficient for certain situations, as it will be for ours. The
general scheme of this reduction is summarized in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1 RNSModRed px, p, B, B 1 q

Require: x in B Y B1 with |x| M p. n  |B|.
Ensure: s  xM 1 p ep in B1 , with e P v1, nw.

1: q Ð xp1 mod M
#in parallel in B
°
n
2: q 1 Ð i1 qi Mi1 m Mi
def

1

x q p
3: s
mod M 1
M
4: return s

Ð

#in parallel in B1

i

B. Round-off operation in lattice-based cryptography
1) GGH-like cryptosystems: Some classical lattice-based
cryptographic protocols rely on the complexity of computation
of a vector of a lattice L close to any given vector c P Z` .
Here and further, ` denotes the dimension of L. If one knows
a nearly orthogonal basis R P Z`` of L, an obvious way
to exhibit such a close vector is to compute coordinates of
c relatively to R, and to select the closest integer vector by
applying a round-off operation. This approach was introduced
by Babai [5]. Consequently, computations of the form tcR1 s
appear to be core operations in lattice-based cryptography. For
instance, this approach forges GGH cryptosystem principles
[6]. Given a fixed integer parameter σ, the plaintext space is
Pσ  vσ, σ w` . The secret key is a basis R of L verifying
the following ”Babai’s condition”:

Dε Ps0, 21 r, 0

σρR

1
2

 ε,

(2)

where ρR denotes the maximum
of columns of R1
°` L1 -norm

1
and is defined as ρR  maxt i1 |pR qi,j | | 1 ¤ j ¤ `u.
This condition ensures that tpR1 s  0 for any p P Pσ .
More precisely, for any p P Pσ and any kR P L (for k P Z` ),
then the Babai condition implies the following equalities:

pp

t

kRqR

1 s  tpR1 s k  k.

(3)

The encryption function requires a public basis B  UR (with
U unimodular: U P GL` pZq). Consequently, an encryption (4)
consists in adding a vector of L to p. This vector is obtained
by using B. Decryption (5) performs the round-off procedure.
Enc ppq  p

kB  c

R
pk Ð
Z` q
(4)

1
Dec pcq  c  tcR sR  p
(5)
Correctness of decryption (i.e. Dec pEnc ppqq  p for p P
Pσ ) is due to (3). Indeed, the vector kBR1  kU is integer.

So it can be ruled out from the round-off operation.
2) RNS Babai’s round-off: In [9] it is suggested to reduce
computational cost of lattice-based cryptoprimitives by using
RNS as an efficient arithmetic. More precisely, an RNS-MRS
algorithm implementing the round-off is given.
As a first step, the rational formula tcR1 s is turned into
def
an integer formula. If d denotes det R then R1  dR1 is

an integer matrix. Consequently, one can rewrite tcR1 s 
def
cR1
1
`
t
d
2 v1 u where v1  p1, . . . , 1q P Z . This leads to (6),
where d denotes the vector d  v1 .

d  rp2cR1 dq mod p2dqs
(6)
2d
The modular reduction is feasible through RNS Montgomery
reduction (Alg. 1) with a main base B whose product of moduli
is denoted M . To do so, one has to compute the following
”Montgomery representations”:
tcR

1 s  0. Thus, by computing tγcR1 s we introduce a
global error which is tγpR1 s  e. Finally, the result obtained
tγpR

at the end of computation is (8).

1 s  2cR1



R̃  2M R1 mod p2dq, d̃  pM dq mod p2dq.

(7)

Since our goal is to provide a full RNS implementation of
the Dec function (5) and because p is in Pσ  vσ, σ w` ,
computation of (6) can be performed within a single modulus
RNS base called mσ . mσ has to be greater than 2σ 1. Thus,
p is recovered from its centered remainder mod mσ . The
reduction mod 2d requires a large base B  tm1 , . . . , mn u
in order to use RNS modular reduction (in our case, B 1 is just
tmσ u). As mentioned in Remark 1.1, a problem is that we can
possibly obtain an uncompletely reduced value.
Remark 1.2: When the modular
 reduction in (6) is performed by using RNSModRed cR̃ d̃, 2d, B, mσ , one
obtains p2cR1
dq mod p2dq
2de with an error vector
e P v1, nw` . Thus, (6) computed together with Alg. 1 gives
1 s  e mod mσ .
tcR
In [9] this error is corrected thanks to a comparison. A
modified version of Alg. 1 is used. A redundant modulus
mr besides a base B 1 allows to perform a second reduction
directly into B 1 . That way, the final error vector e belongs to
v0, 1w` . However, it does not completely solve the problem.
The solution in [9] is to use a large base B 1 which verifies
M 1 ¡ 4d ¡ }p2cR1
dq mod p2dq
2de}8 . Then, a
conversion into MRS is performed. It allows the comparison
with 2d. Finally, this allows to recover and to correct e.
Our purpose is to avoid a costly conversion into any other
number system than RNS. So we choose to compute the
modular reduction in (6) via Alg. 1 as is. The next section
aims at finding another type of approach to correct the error
vector e. To achieve it, some properties of R will be used.
II. ACCELERATING THE ROUND - OFF
A. Correcting modular reduction in round-off computation
We aim at recovering e in order to correct it. It will allow to
compute tcR1 s  e thanks to (6) used together with Alg. 1.
1) Establishing a strategy: Following Remark 2.1 will be
a guideline for the new strategy.
Remark 2.1: If one can find an integer γ such that tcR1 s 
0 mod γ for any ciphertext c and such that e  0 mod γ as
soon as e  0, then e can easily be detected.
A priori there is no reason that such a γ exists. Thus, we
consider some integer γ ¡ 0 and we compute tγcR1 s. Since
this round-off is still computed via (6) and Alg. 1, we obtain
1 s  e, where e belongs to v1, nw` . Moreover, we
tγcR
have tγcR1 s  tγpR1 s γ tcR1 s (cf. (3)). But now,
Babai’s condition (2) for R does not guarantee anymore that

ñ

1 s  e  γ tcR1 s tγpR1 s  e
(8)



1

1
tγcR
s  e mod γ  tγpR
s  e mod γ (9)
tγcR

Consequently, if there exists an integer γ large enough so that
1 s  e is computable from its residue mod γ, we will
tγpR
be able to correct it. Then, the exact round-off result can be
obtained. This is the purpose of following remark.
Remark 2.2: Let modc denote the centered remaindersmod
1
1 s 
γ. If for any i P v1, `w the bounds t γ 
2 u ¤ t γpR
i
γ

1
ei ¤ t 2 u hold, then one can retrieve tγpR s  e by:

1 s  e  tγpR1 s  e modc γ.
(10)

1
Therefore, using (8), (9) and (10), tcR s can be exactly
tγpR

computed via following equality:
1 s  1 tγcR1 s  e  t tγcR1 s  e modc γ u .
tcR
γ
(11)
From now on, the goal is to find a condition so that γ
satisfies the bounds emphasized by Remark 2.2. Then, after
computation of tγcR1 s through (6), we will be able to deduce the exact round-off tcR1 s by using (11). Furthermore,
it may be noticed that since we need to compute tγcRs mod
γ through (6) in order to obtain (9), γ must be coprime to 2d.
2) Finding an adequate γ: We need to find an acceptable
odd γ for which the bounds described in Remark 2.2 are
verified for any p P Pσ and any e P v1, nw` . For that
purpose, we use Remark 2.3.

1
1
Remark 2.3: If t γ 
γpR1 i  ei t γ2 u 21
2 u 2
for all i P v1, `w, then Remark 2.2 and (10) hold.
From Remark 2.3 we deduce that γ will depend on ε in
Babai’s condition (2). Theorem 2.4 clarifies this dependancy.
Theorem 2.4: Let R P Z`` be a basis of lattice L verifying
Condition (2) for a certain ε Ps0, 12 r. Let e P v1, nw` be an
integer vector (with n ¥ 1), and c  p kB with p P Pσ
and k P Z` . Then, for any odd integer γ verifying γε ¥ n,
the following equality holds:

1 s  e  tγcR1 s  e modc γ.
Proof: Due to Babai’s condition, pR1 Ps 12 ε, 21  εr` .
Consequently, any ith component of pγpR1  eq verifies:
tγpR

 γ2



γpR1  e

γε  n

i

 γε 1.
1
bounds t γ 
¤
2 u
γ
2

Hence, by using
Remark 2.3, the
1  e s ¤ t γ u hold as soon as γ verifies the folt γpR
2
i
lowing set of conditions:
#

t γ2 1 u  12 ¤  γ2
γ
1 ¤ t γ2 u
2  γε

γε  n
1
2

ô

#

γε ¥ n
γε ¥ 1

ô γε ¥ n

(12)
Then Remark 2.2 and (9) allow to conclude the proof.
Theorem 2.4 provides a lower bound for acceptable γ’s for
1
any basis R verifying σρR
2  ε. This enables to directly

`
σ
max
min
median
mean diff.

128
3
2003
10
66.5
193.7

256
3
4775
6
37.5
260.9

384
3
3637
6
31
162.6

512
3
4059
6
28.5
193.6

640
3
683
5
21
41.6

768
2
334
4
9
13.2

TABLE I: Statistics about γR,1 for 100 random LLL-reduced matrices R
for each dim. `

Fig. 1: Computing tcR1 s mod mσ by formula (6), together with strategy
described in Corollary 2.5

deduce the following corollary, which expresses this bound no
more in terms of ε but by directly using the value of ρR . It
also details how to use previous theorem to perform an exact
round-off through formula (6).
Corollary 2.5: Let R be a basis of a lattice L such that
1
σρR
2 , n ¥ 1 an integer (e.g. for our purpose, n is the size
of RNS base B involved in the modular reduction, Alg. 1), and
def
mσ a modulus coprime to 2d. Let’s denote γR,n  r 12n
2σρR s
and r  p2γcR1 dq mod p2dq 2d  e with e P v1, nw` .
For any γ coprime to 2dmσ and s.t. γ ¥ γR,n , we have:

1 s mod mσ 
tcR

 2γcR1 d  r





2d

"

2γcR1 d  r
modc γ
2d

*




γ 1 


mσ

(13)
Proof: We fix ε  21  σρR . It follows that γR,n  r nε s 
2n
r
12ρR s is a lower bound for acceptable odd γ’s with respect
to theorem 2.4. Moreover, by using (6) and (8), we can write:

2γcR1 d  r
 tγcR1 s  e  γ tcR1 s tγpR1 s  e.
2d
Furthermore, previous theorem enables to write tγpR1 s 
1
e  2γcR2d dr modc γ. Hence (13) immediately follows.
Given adequate γ with respect to Corollary 2.5, the strategy
is to compute the
 whole formula (6) mod mσ and mod γ with
RNSModRed cR̃ d̃, 2d, B, tγ, mσ u where Montgomery
representations are now the following ones:
R̃



def

2γM R

1

mod p2dq, d̃

 pM dq mod p2dq.

def

(14)

Then, residues modulo γ enable to correct residues modulo
mσ of rounded value tcR1 s. Fig. 1 illustrates this approach.
B. About the size of γ
GGH-like protocols with parameter σ P N are based on
1
the matrices R P Z`` verifying σρR
2 . By definition the
lower bound γR,n exists for any such matrix R and any n. It
is clear that closer to 21 the σρR is, the bigger γR,n will be.
For implementing an efficient RNS CVP round-off procedure which uses new error correction technique, γR,n should

be ”reasonably” small, meaning comparatively to word size
β of other moduli (i.e. m β for all m P B). Indeed, when
γR,n is not larger than β, γ can be a single modulus. Then, the
base B 1 in Alg. 1 is just the set of two moduli tγ, mσ u. In this
case, the needed comparison to recover a centered remainder
modulo γ is directly performed on the residue mod γ. Hence,
the present technique is particularly efficient for matrices R
n
1
β).
such that 0 σρR
2  β (i.e. γR,n
In practice, the constraint γR,n
β does not seem to be
so restrictive for usual values of β  2r (i.e. r ¥ 16). By
analysing basis R obtained through LLL-reduction of matrices
randomly picked up in v`, `w`` (as suggested in [16]) for
some dimensions ` from 128 to 768 with respect to σ  2 or
3, it appears (cf. Tab. I) that γR,1 is most of the time quite
”small” (i.e. comparatively to β). Then, choosing a lattice basis
R with γR,n β should not weaken the protocol.
C. Full RNS Round-off CVP algorithm
The next part presents a detailed algorithm computing
c  tcR1 sR. It is based on Alg. 1 together with (6), and it
performs the acceleration technique. To provide an optimized
algorithm, all possible precomputations for Alg. 2 are provided
in a first part. A radix β  2r as word size is fixed from now
on. All moduli used are constrained to own only one β-digit.
So any involved matrix R is assumed to verify γR,n β with
n  |B |. Next, the proposed algorithm is detailed. Finally, a
discussion about computational and space costs is provided.
1) Precomputations: Precomputable data (22) are found by
expanding involved expressions. We aim at computing c 
1 sR mod mσ . c is the only input variable. Due to our
tcR
previous discussions, the strategy exploits following quantities:
q1



n
¸



qmi Mi , qmi

 |  pcR̃

i 1

r  |2γcR1

d|2d

s  tγcR1 s  e 

2de 

cR̃

d̃qp2dMi q1 |mi
d̃ 2dq1
M


(15)
(16)

1
2γcR1 d  r
(17)
2d
First, (15) is obtained in RNS base B. Second, (16) is
computed in tγ, mσ u. Then, (17) is obtained modulo γ and
mσ . Finally centered remainder of s mod γ enables to correct
residues in RNS channel mσ so that tcR1 s mod mσ can be
obtained (cf. (13) in Corollary 2.5).
In B: By using
 R̃mi and d̃mi in (22) we can re-write


(15) with qmi  cR̃mi d̃mi  for all mi P B. For base
mi
conversion, it will be useful to write the set of n vectors qmi
as a matrix Q whose ith row is the vector qmi .

In tγ u: If we develop right member of (17) modulo γ
by using (15) and (16) we obtain:


R̃

c
 2dM

|s|γ  

d
2d





d̃
2dM


n
¸
qmi 
 .
mi 



i 1

(18)

γ

Due to precomputations (22), the required result modulo γ is:


 tγpR1 s  e. (19)
In tmσ u: The one modulus-base tmσ u is dedicated to
the full computation of c  tcR1 sR. First, by using (13)
sγ



def

cγ R̃γ

d̃γ

hγ Q modc γ

from corollary and (17) and (19), it comes that:

c

where


 tcR1 sR

mσ

|  s|m 
σ



c


 


 R̃2γM R1
c
2dM


n
°



d̃ M d
2dM



i 1

precomputed data (22) allow to write:

c





 tcR1 sRm  cR̃σ
σ

phσ Q

qmi
mi






 

 

R̃σ



d̃σ

 





. Thus,



`

sγ q Rσ 

 



(20)

mσ









 R̃ 
 d̃ 
B, R̃mi 

 ; d̃mi

 2dMi 
 2dMi 
mi




 mi 




 1
 R̃ 
 M d d̃ 



 ; d̃γ

 ; hγ
m 
 2dM 
 2dM 
i γ
γ
γ


 


1
R
R̃
2γM
R


R ; Rσ  
I`


2dγM
γ mσ
mσ






 1 
 d̃ M d 


R ; hσ

m 

 2dγM

@mi P
R̃γ

d̃σ




1
p
s  sγ q R
γ
mσ

 

.
mσ
(21)



i mσ

r
r
r

 24
 32
 64

64
6.9%
8.0%
12.4%

128
3.2%
3.7%
5.7%

256
1.5%
1.7%
2.6%

512
0.7%
0.8%
1.2%

1024
0.3%
0.4%
0.6%

TABLE II: Memory overhead of RNS precomputations comparatively to
binary storage of R1 for several word-sizes β

¤¤

1 i n



mσ

Algorithm 2 Full RNS Round-off CVP algorithm
Require: input c; data: RNS base B with M ¡ p`c8 1q and
n  |B |, γ ¥ γR,n , mσ ¥ 2σ 1, M , γ, mσ and 2d all
pairwise coprime, and precomputations
(22).

Ensure: c  tcR1 s  R modc mσ .
1: pcm qmPBYtγ,mσ u Ð Bin_to_RNSpcq #1st parallel step
2: for i  1 to n do
#2nd parallel step
3:
Qi, Ð |cmi R̃mi d̃mi |mi
#qmi , (15)
4: end for
5: sγ Ð |cγ R̃γ
d̃γ |γ
#2nd parallel step; part of (19)
nd
6: p
σ R̃σ d̃σ |mσ #2 parallel step; part of (21)
mσ1 Ð |cm
qγ
Ð hhσγ Q P Z2`
#3rd parallel step
7:
q1 σ

#4th parallel step; (19)
8: sγ Ð sγ
q1 γ modc γ
1
th
9: tmσ Ð |q σ
sγ |mσ
#5 parallel step; part of (21)
10: pmσ Ð |pmσ
tmσ Rσ |mσ
#6th parallel step; (21)
11: return pmσ modc mσ

¤¤

1 i n

(22)
2) Main Algorithm 2: RNS base B used for the modular
reduction (16) verifies 2dM ¡ }cR̃ d̃}8 for any input c.
Thus we assume that the set of all possible }c}8 is bounded
by some integer c8 . c can own negative coefficients. Finally,
B is assumed to satisfy M ¡ `c8 1.
Complexity analysis: Complexity of RNS algorithms is
generally expressed in terms of elementary modular multiplications with respect to some moduli m such that m β  2r .
To simplify complexity analysis, EMMβ denotes such modular
multiplication. The n 1 moduli of B Y tγ u are assumed to
own only one β-digit. Since bit-size of mσ and β can differ
by orders of magnitude, it is useful to denote βσ the quantity
2rlog2 pmσ qs . Binary-to-RNS conversions are based on decomposition of coefficients of c in base β. Residues of powers
of β can be precomputed. That way, the conversion requires
pn 1q`  rlogβ pc8 qsEMMβ `  rlogβσ pc8 qsEMMβσ . When
this conversion is done, the cost of steps 2 to 11 of RNS
CVP

algorithm 2 is pn 1q`2 n` EMMβ
2`2 n` EMMβσ .
Space efficiency: Precomputed powers of β for binaryto-RNS conversion cost no more than pn 1qprlogβ pc8 qs  1q
β-words and prlogβσ pc8 qs  1q βσ -words. Precomputations
(22) represent pn 1qp`2 `q n β-words and 2`2 ` n

 2r and dimensions `.

βσ -words. To compare with a binary approach, each coefficient

of R1 should be computed with a rlog2 c8 p 12  σρR q1 s
bit precision to ensure no decryption error [6]. We recall
def
that γR,n  rn  p 21  σρR q1 s and that our approach is
optimal when γR,n
β. Thus, the binary method requires
at most rlog2 p c8nβ qs  `2 bits of storage. Tab. II shows
some memory ratio between binary storage of R1 and RNS
precomputations where we assume that c8  d and d is set
3
to Hadamard’s bound ` 2 ` (e.g. R results in a LLL-reduction
2
applied to some random matrix in v`, `w` , cf. [16]).
3) Comparison with hybrid RNS-MRS approach [9]: In [9],
the final computation is also performed modulo mσ . The same
main RNS base B than ours (i.e. M ¡ `c8 1) is used
for computing modular reduction. The main difference in this
other approach is that an auxilairy base B 1 with M 1 ¡ 4d is
required. Indeed, the result of reduction is in v0, 4dv, and it
must be compared with 2d through MRS. The first step of
reduction is a fast conversion (like in Alg. 1) from B to B 1 Y
tmr , mσ u. Then, a second reduction is based on a conversion
from tmr u to B 1 Y tmσ u (simple ”duplication” of residues
mod mr ) in order to reduce the result in v0, 4dv. Montgomery
representations differ from (14) but their size is still the same.
They are R̃  |2mr M R1 |2d and d̃  |mr M d|2d .
By denoting k  |B 1 |, i.e. k  rlogβ p4dqs, the extra cost
(mem. and comp.) of hybrid approach are due to computations
in B 1 and to the MRS conversion. In terms of precomputations
dedicated to modular reduction, the overhead is k p`2 `q
pk 1qn β-words for adequate matrices and vectors R̃m1j ,
1
1
d̃m1j , hm1j and extra specific values |m
r |m1j for each mj P
1
B . Size of precomputations modulo mσ is almost identical.

`

r
r
r

 24
 32
 64

64
97.0%
95.6%
91.2%

128
98.8%
98.1%
95.8%

256
99.5%
99.2%
98.1%

512
99.8%
99.7%
99.2%

1024
99.9%
99.9%
99.6%

TABLE III: Memory overhead of [9] comparatively to present full RNS
approach
`
24
32
64

for several word-sizes β
64
128
133.5%
141.9%
123.1%
130.5%
105.1%
112.1%

 2r and dimensions `.
256
149.1%
136.4%
116.7%

512
155.9%
141.7%
120.2%

1024
162.3%
146.6%
123.0%

TABLE IV: Number of EMMβ overhead of [9] comparatively to present
full RNS approach for several word-sizes β

 2r and dimensions `.

1
The only extra cost is due to |m
r |mσ for second conversion.
Next, MRS conversion requires to precompute kpk21q residues
|pm1i q1 |m1j for 1 ¤ i j ¤ k. A similar analysis leads
to an extra cost in terms of EMMβ given by pk`2 k`pn
1q kpk21q qEMMβ . Tab. III and IV show these overheads with
3
bounds c8  d ¤ ` 2 ` . In this case, n  k. Thus the RNSMRS approach requires around twice more moduli. Ratio in
Tab. IV are clearly greater than 2 because of MRS conversions.

Fig. 2: ALU’s Rower

III. T OWARDS HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION
In order to use concurrency properties of RNS, a feasibility
study about efficient and dedicated architecture for hardware
implementations on FPGA is led. The chosen architecture is
based on Cox-Rower architecture proposed in [15], and in
[17] with several modifications. We also explain how the main
Algorithm 2 fits with such type of architecture.
A. Cox-Rower Architecture
In [15], the Cox-Rower architecture was proposed along
with a new approach for base conversion. It has been improved
several times [2]–[4], [17]–[19]. Its structure consists in a
Sequencer, a Cox and a set of Rower units. Rowers deal with
the core of RNS
°n computations. They compute modular sumof-products i1 ai bi mod mi . A Rower is divided into 2
stages. The first one consists in multiplication of 2 elements,
and the second one is in charge of reducing and accumulating
elements from first stage as shown in Fig. 2. Efficient algorithms for reduction inside the Rower are proposed in [2],
[3], [17], [18]. They take advantage either by the pseudoMersenne form of the moduli, which is mi  2r  µi
with µi
2r{2 , allowing a direct reduction, or by using a
second level of Montgomery reduction as proposed in [17]
with gcdpmi , 2r q  1.
B. Proposed Architecture
Our architecture is based on the one proposed in [2], [17],
[18], with several modifications. The Cox unit is unnecessary
for our purpose, as Alg. 2 does not reduce the base conversion.
So as to decrease the area of a Rower, 2 multipliers out of 3 are
removed from the Rower for a cost of 3 extra cycles to execute
the reduction inside it. Indeed, one of the most time-consuming
operation in RNS is the base
°n conversion procedure which is a
computation of the form i1 ai bi mod mi . Moreover, the

Fig. 3: Proposed Rower architecture

most time-consuming operations in Alg. 2 are the matrixvector products. By using a second level of Montgomery
reduction coupled with lazy-reduction [20], it is possible to
reduce a sum of products only once. Hence, the second stage
in charge of reduction can be deleted by reusing first stage.
Fig. 3 shows the proposed implementation for Rower Unit.
From lines 5 to 11 of Alg. 2, only 2 Rower units
are required. To compute the modc function (line 8), two
tricks are used to make it easy in hardware without using signed numbers. First, one can see that sγ,i modc γ 
"
sγ,i
if sγ,i ¤ tγ {2u
. This can be used if the comsγ,i  γ
otherwise
parison is easy to perform. Thus, our second trick is to choose
γ  2α  1 such that α  2θ . It makes the comparison
easy to be done in hardware (we just need to check the
θth bit). Moreover, these 2 Rower units are used to compute
respectively mod mσ and mod γ. Because mσ is small (¤ 7
as σ P t2, 3u), and because of the trick for γ, we dedicate
two Rower units to computations mod mσ and mod γ. The γ
Rower unit remains the same than the one in Fig. 3 but with
the test of the θth bit in order to subtract or not γ.
Alg. 3 details the computation of an inner reduction by
using the proposed Rower implementation. From line 1 to 4,
we multiply and accumulate the result. Then, the reduction
is performed at steps 5 and 6. Because of the Rower unit
pipeline, the computation cannot be done directly. Thus, we
need to wait 2 depth of the pipeline. However, as usually in
cryptography, most of computations can be pipelined. Thus, no

idle cycles are induced. We can show that the computations in
Alg. 2 can be done with a 100% occupancy of the pipeline. In
order to fully compute Alg. 2 with the proposed architecture,
the residues have to be reduced from 2mi to mi before they
go to the main bus (as we need the exact value during the base
conversion procedure). This last reduction can be done by a
module added in the main bus. It reduces the residues going
through the bus.
Algorithm 3 InnerReductionpa, b, mq

Require: A set of a, b P pZ{2mZqk , s parameter for lazy-reduction,
r s
m1 mod
and d the pipeline depth
°k 2
Ensure: t  i1 ai bi 2pr sq mod m, 0 ¤ t 2m
1: t Ð a1  b1
#Cycle 1: Multiply
2: for i Ð 2 to k do
#Cycle 2 to k
3:
t Ð t ai  bi
#Mult. and acc.
4: end for
5: q Ð pt  m1 q mod 2r s #Cycle k 1 d: Mult. and get
r s LSB
6: t Ð t 2rqsm #Cycle k 1 2d: Mult., cycle k 2 2d: add
and get r 1 MSB
7: return t

C. Full RNS CVP Algorithm Implementation
Alg. 4 gives the procedure to compute lines 2 to 4 of
Alg. 2 by using the Rower unit detailed previously. Most of the
precomputations have to be done using the inner Montgomery
representation in the Rower unit (i.e. precomputed values have
to be multiplied by 2r s where r the radix size and s enables
the use of lazy reduction). Other steps of Alg. 2 are not
detailed but are executed in a similar way. The point is that all
computations are modular sums of products, fitting well with
Cox-Rower architecture. As emphasized in comments of main
Alg. 2, there are 6 main steps which do not overlap.
Features of the Cox-Rower architecture presented here
match GPGPU and multi-core CPU architecture purposes.
More generally, practical considerations that we make are
essentially due to the well flexibility of main algorithm. Since
it involves only RNS and fast base conversions, parallelization
is easily achieved. In next section, we analyse feasibility of
FPGA implementation. The efficiency of such platforms has
been proven for RNS implementations.
IV. A BOUT FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTATION ON FPGA
Estimations about performances and area for some dimensions will be given. Parameters are determined by a radix size
β  2r , and by Hadamard’s bound for c8 and d.
A. Performance and Memory Analysis
With n 2 parallel Rowers, binary-to-RNS conversion requires rlogβ pc8 qs1 n cycles when residues of powers of β
are precomputed. Table V details the number of cycles needed
to execute Alg. 2, as well as the number of precomputed
elements required for each of the 6 main steps of Alg. 2. For
instance, we can notice that lines 5 and 6 completely overlap
with the computation of Q detailed in Alg. 4.

Algorithm 4 Full RNS CVP Detailed: Q computation step
Require: Residues of c in B and precomputations among (22)
Ensure: Q P Zn` s.t. Qi,  p|cR̃ d̃|mi q for 1 ¤ i ¤ n
1: for i Ð 1 to n do
#concurrently in n Rowers
2:
Qi, Ð p0q`
3:
for y Ð 1 to ` do
#cols of R̃mi
4:
for x Ð 1 to ` do
#rows of R̃mi

5:
Qi,y Ð Qi,y cmi ,x  R̃mi
x,y



end for
Qi,y Ð Qi,y

6:
7:

d̃mi

#last add.: line 4 of Alg. 2
y

p

q

p

q

8:
end for
#this loop: ` 1
` cycles
9:
for x
1 to ` do
#reduc. step, no idle cycle here
1
10:
qmi ,x
Qi,x
m
mod 2r s
i
11:
end for
#this loop: ` cycles
12:
for x
1 to ` do #no idle cyc. when pipeline depth `
Qi,x qmi ,x mi
13:
Qi,x
2r s
14:
end for
#this loop: 2` cycles
15: end for
#this loop: ` 4
` cycles
16: return Q

Ð

Ð



Ð
Ð

lines of Algorithm 2
1
2 to 6
7
8
9
10
Total

Cycles
n`
` 4 `
n 3 `
` 3
` 3
` 4 `
2` 2n
6

p
p

q
q

p
p

q

Memory used (nb of words)
n 1 n 2
n 2 ` 1 ` 2
2 n 2
2
2
` 1 ` 2
n 2 n `2 ` 1
`2 ` 2n

p
p
q

13 `

qp
qpp
q

p

p
p

q
q

q
qp

q

q

TABLE V: Performance and Memory Size

p`, nq
p64, 16q
p128, 38q

Mem./Rower
(Elts)
4162
16514

Area/Rower
(LUTs/Regs/DSP/BRAM)

19
(30/17/2/15)
19
(30/17/2/56)

Freq.
MHz
400
300

Tot. Area
(estimation)
304
(480/272/32/240)
722
(1140/646/76/2128)

TABLE VI: Results of P&R for ML510 Eval. board (Virtex5)

p`, nq
p64, 16q
p128, 38q

Mem./Rower
(Elts)
4162
16514

Area/Rower
(LUTs/Regs/DSP/BRAM)

20
(60/17/2/15)
20
(60/17/2/56)

Freq.
MHz
468
415

Tot. Area
(estimation)
320
(960/272/32/240)
760
(2280/646/76/2128)

TABLE VII: Results of P&R for KC705 Eval. board (Kintex7)

B. Implementation
We focus on FPGA SRAM devices. Indeed, FPGA are
good candidates for hardware implementation as they embed
DSP blocks as well as Block RAM. Moreover, the Rower
unit proposed in previous section easily fits in Block RAM
and DSP blocks, without adding too many LUTs or registers
from the FPGA (except for multiplexers and control). Thus,
good performances can be reached in terms of frequency. We
implement the Rower unit in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA family
(Tab. VI) as well as Kintex-7 (Tab. VII) and estimate overall
area and performance. We take r  24 as bit-size of radix by
cascading 2 DSP blocks in order to have few more bits for
lazy reduction (10 bits). The results show good perspective to

implement lattice on FPGA, but a memory bottleneck rapidly
appears. Indeed, for `  128, there are not enough BRAM
in both devices (Virtex-5 and Kintex-7) to store precomputed
data.
C. Discussion
In previous part, we have shown that hardware implementation of lattices can be done using RNS and Algorithm 2.
Adding a margin error of 25% to the maximal frequency of
the design, one can easily deduce that we need around 20µs
to compute a close lattice vector in dimension `  64, which
can be implemented on FPGA as is. For dimension 128, too
much precomputations have to be stored. Thus, it could be
interesting to work on specific architectures such as clusters
of FPGA, or with a DMA for quick changes of memorized
values. Nevertheless, our hardware implementation shows a
real good trade-off for all existing RNS architecture in terms
of footprint or reachable frequency [2]–[4], [17].
V. C ONCLUSION
A method for implementing the Babai round-off procedure
in RNS has been proposed. We provide the first full RNS
implementation of an algorithm solving the CVP (i.e. without
using MRS). The efficiency of this technique depends on the
secret lattice basis R which must verify some condition connected to RNS word size. Nevertheless, by analysing several
random matrices verifying Babai’s condition, the new requirement does not seem restrictive when considering practical RNS
word sizes. An architecture for hardware implemention has
been detailed. It is based on a Cox-Rower like architecture
which is traditionally used for RNS implementations. Some
modifications are suggested in order to fit with specific features
of lattice-based algorithms. We have given an analysis of
FPGA implementation for dimensions 64 and 128. Despite
some memory bottlenecks, the results highlight the viability
of our approach in terms of flexibility. Indeed, the principles
of our implementation match GPGPU and multi-core CPU
features. It reinforces the fact that the RNS is an excellent
candidate for practical implementation of lattice-based protocols.
We fully realize that 64 and 128 are not dimensions high
enough to allow lattice-based cryptography with secure parameters. Nevertheless, this implementation should be seen as
a proof of concept. It opens the door to multiple directions
such as approaches by blocks and pipeline, or by using FPGA
clusters or eventually multi-core CPU’s or GPU’s. All those
future works will use as their core this new proposition.
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